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Nothing Is Not Enough: 
Fix the Absurd Post-Booker Federal Sentencing System 
24 FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER _ (2012) 
 
Frank O. Bowman, III 




 In February 2012, the U.S. Sentencing Commission generously invited me to testify at a 
hearing addressing the question of what, if anything, ought to be done to modify the advisory 
federal guidelines system bequeathed us by the Supreme Court in United States v. Booker.
1
 The 
remarks that follow largely track what I said at the time, but have been amplified in light of the 
excellent presentations I heard there and of intervening developments. I advance three 
arguments:   
 First, the post-Booker advisory system retains most of the flaws of the system it replaced, 
while adding new ones, and its sole relative advantage – that of conferring additional (and 
effectively unreviewable) discretion on sentencing judges – is insufficient to justify its retention 
as a permanent system.   
 Second, there exist a number of constitutionally permissible alternatives to the court-
created Booker system, one of which -- that originally proposed by the Constitution Project and 
more recently endorsed by Judge Sessions – is markedly superior to the present system.   
 Third, the difficult problem is not designing a sentencing mechanism better than either 
the pre- or post-Booker guidelines, but ensuring that such a system, once in place, does not 
replicate pre-Booker experience and become a one-way upward ratchet prescribing ever higher 
sentences.  I offer suggestions about how it might be solved. However, any fair-minded observer 
must concede both the difficulty of this problem and the justice of the concern that, however 
imperfect the advisory system, it may be the best that can be achieved given the present 
constellation of institutional and political forces. 
II. The Post-Booker Advisory System  
Considered on its own merits, the system bequeathed us by Booker is indefensible.  It retains 
virtually every feature excoriated by critics of the original sentencing guidelines. Its extreme 
‘advisoriness,’ while partially ameliorating some problems with the original guidelines, 
reintroduces the very concerns about unreviewable judicial arbitrariness that spawned the 
structured sentencing movement in the first place.  More importantly, the post-Booker system 
does not solve the biggest problem with the pre-Booker system – that its architecture and 
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institutional arrangements predisposed the Commission’s rule-making process to become a one-
way upward ratchet which raised sentences often and lowered them virtually never. 
A. Post-Booker Advisory Guidelines Retain Nearly All the Defects of Pre-Booker 
Presumptive Guidelines 
The original guidelines were condemned as too complicated,
2
 both because they contained so 
many rules that were purportedly difficult to understand and, more tellingly, because they 
required parties to litigate and judges to adjudicate too many gradations of too many categories 
of facts.  But the current system is even more complicated than the old. The guidelines 
themselves remain in place, almost unchanged.  Probation officers are legally obliged to write 
presentence reports that are virtually identical to those they wrote before 2005.  The parties are 
obliged to make the same sorts of factual presentations and legal arguments they made before 
2005.  District judges remain legally obliged, on pain of appellate reversal, to make the same 
multifarious findings of fact and to correctly apply the same voluminous rules to those facts to 
determine a guidelines range.  Then, once the old familiar dance is complete, the judge does a 
few new steps to the tune of “§3553(a) factors” and only then imposes a sentence.  Even the 
courts of appeals retain much of their old pre-Booker burden inasmuch as they remain obliged to 
entertain and decide questions regarding interpretation of guidelines rules, even though they now 
have little authority to insist that district courts sentence within the guidelines range. In short, all 
of the procedural and computational complexities that were so often the source of pre-Booker 
complaints about the guidelines remain mandatory, even as the product of that process has been 
declared the next thing to a legal nullity. 
The old guidelines were criticized because their many factual findings fed into a grid that 
subdivided the universe of possible sentences into 258 boxes which critics said served largely to 
create a reassuring illusion of rationally calibrated allocations of punishment.  But the advisory 
system still uses the exact same grid. 
The old guidelines were derided because the numerous judge-found facts that determined a 
defendant’s guideline range were said to be a tail that wagged the sentencing dog, i.e., that post-
conviction judge-found facts had a far greater influence on a defendant’s final sentence than the 
jury-found elements of the crime.  But the same description applies to the post-Booker advisory 
system.  Booker’s “solution” to the tail-wags-dog problem was not to eliminate or even reduce 
the number of judge-found sentence-affecting facts enumerated in federal statutes and guidelines, 
but was instead to imagine that, by declaring the Guidelines advisory, those facts would no 
longer move the dog of sentencing outcomes.  But, of course, the dog still moves.  In FY 2010 
and FY 2011, about 55% of all federal defendants were sentenced within the applicable guideline 
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 and even among defendants sentenced outside the range, the range (determined by all 
those judicial findings of facts) still exercises a substantial anchoring effect.  Given that, in the 
five years immediately preceding Blakely, guidelines compliance averaged around 65%,
4
 the best 
one can say about the advisory system is that the guidelines tail is still wagging the sentencing 
dog, but about 10% less vigorously. 
Curiously, the constitutional value those advancing the tail-wags-dog critique ostensibly 
sought to protect – the power of juries to decide sentence-affecting facts – has quietly vanished 
from the post-Booker conversation.  If concern for jury power was ever more than a convenient 
stick with which to beat a system unpopular on other grounds, it may be worth noting that the 
practical effect of Booker on jury participation in sentence-determinative fact-finding has, if 
anything, been negative.  The percentage of federal defendants convicted by trial, rather than 
plea, already low before Booker, has declined steadily since 2006,
5
 and in FY 2011dropped to 
3.1%,
6
 the second lowest level in history.
7
 
More importantly, the real procedural deficiency of the pre-Booker guidelines was never the 
absence of jury participation, but the low level of due process protection afforded defendants 
seeking to contest aggravating guidelines facts.
8
  The government’s burden of proof was a mere 
preponderance.  The defendant had no discovery rights, other than the government’s general 
Brady obligation to disclose favorable evidence,
9
 no right of confrontation or cross-
examination,
10
 and not even a right to an adversarial hearing in many instances.
11
  Even though, 
as noted above, the advisory guidelines continue to either determine or strongly influence the 
sentences of the vast majority of federal defendants, the former dearth of procedural due process 
persists.  And precisely because the guidelines are now legally advisory, the argument for 
increasing procedural protections for guidelines fact-finding is dramatically weaker.  As I wrote 
in 2010: 
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Defendants [after Booker] are poorly placed to demand new procedural 
protections for the determination of Guidelines facts the Court insists have no 
legal consequence.  If anything, the effect of Booker and its progeny will surely 
be to diminish due process protections in federal sentencing as trial and appellate 
judges become less and less concerned about accuracy in an “advisory” system.  
For anyone seriously concerned about the tail-wags-dog problem, Booker has 
created the worst of all worlds – a complex system of fact-dependent rules, which 
in truth heavily influence outcomes, but in which judges are cavalier about facts 
because the rules have no formal legal force.
12
 
The old guidelines were criticized as the product of an opaque rule-making process not 
subject to the APA or other openness in government laws or to judicial review.
13
  Relatedly, 
many observers complained that Commission rulemaking was subject to congressional 
micromanagement, either by direct amendment of guidelines, statutory directive, or informal 
pressure.  While the Commission has taken laudable voluntary steps to open up its processes in 
recent years, its institutional position in the government and the laws governing its rulemaking 
processes are unaffected by Booker.  
Perceptive critics of the pre-Booker guidelines were concerned that they abolished parole and 
with it the opportunity for a later second look at the appropriateness of the original judge-
imposed sentence.
14
  Of course, this feature survives Booker.  Thus, the legal authority to 
determine how much time a defendant will actually serve, which before 1987 was shared 
between district judges and the U.S. Parole Commission, and from 1987-2005 was shared 
between the Sentencing Commission and both district and appellate judges, is now effectively 
the sole province of individual district judges.  In short, district judges now wield near-absolute 
power to determine the length of a defendant's incarceration, far more real-world sentencing 
power than at any time since the advent of a federal parole authority in 1910.
15
   
The old guidelines were also disparaged for taking insufficient account of the individual 
characteristics of criminal defendants in setting offense levels and thus sentencing ranges.  
Critics noted that the guidelines prescribed precise increments of increased or reduced 
punishment for a multitude of offense-related factors, but included no such correlation between 
personal characteristics (other than criminal history) and offense level.  Moreover, the old 
guidelines declared many such characteristics to be banned or “not ordinarily relevant” in 
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awarding a departure outside the guidelines range.
16
  But the advisory guidelines have exactly 
the same structure.  Calculation of the guideline range is still focused almost exclusively on 
offense characteristics and criminal history.  And though the Commission has cautiously 
modified the wording of several sections of Chapter 5H relating to age, mental or emotional 
condition, and physical condition to permit consideration of these factors in departing from the 
range in a few more cases,
17
 the Commission has provided no guidance to courts in determining 
when or how these factors should be considered other than to say that it should be done in 
unusual or atypical cases.  The real difference between the present system and the one it replaced 
lies not in any material improvement in the Guidelines themselves, but in the fact that judges are 
now legally at liberty to ignore them.  
B. The Curious Attraction of Booker’s Advisory System 
Here, at last, we come to the crux of the matter – the point that explains the surpassingly odd 
spectacle of folks who spent the first two decades of the guidelines era vehemently denouncing 
the guidelines for precisely the deficiencies listed above now mounting an impassioned defense 
of a post-Booker system that retains virtually every flaw they previously deplored.   
This precipitous reversal at least makes institutional sense in the case of judicial guidelines 
critics.  For many judges, the main problem with the guidelines, particularly after the 2003 
PROTECT Act, was their tight constraint of judicial sentencing discretion.  Now, although some 
judges may consider the required fact-finding and guideline-calculating a nuisance, it is a ritual 
to which they are accustomed, it provides them with reassuring benchmarks for routine cases, 
and Booker has freed them either to use or ignore the results as suits them in particular cases.  Of 
course, judges must provide some explanation for their sentences, but the reality is that any 
explanation not flamboyantly exceeding the boundaries of rationality will now survive appellate 
scrutiny.  In short, district judges like advisory guidelines because they restore lost institutional 
authority.  
The affection of the defense community for advisory guidelines is based, not in concerns 
about process or the sanctity of judicial discretion, but in perceptions about outcomes. The true 
ground of the defense community’s objection to the old guidelines was never their structural and 
procedural defects.  It was their severity.  In the early days, the severity critique was primarily 
directed at drug cases, but over time the concern broadened to include many other offense 
classifications, recent high-profile examples including white collar crime and pornography.  The 
defense community’s support of advisory guidelines is only explainable as the outgrowth of a 
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perception that the advisory system produces more favorable (i.e., more lenient) sentences for 
some appreciable class of defendants. 
This perception has some basis in fact.  After all, in FY 2011, 43.6% of all defendants were 
sentenced below the applicable guideline range as compared to only 29.7% in FY 2003 (the last 
full year of sentencing data before the Blakely decision in 2004).
18
  If about 14% more 
defendants are now receiving below-range sentences, then surely some of them are receiving 
shorter sentences than would have been the case before Booker.  This intuition seems to be borne 
out by Figure 1, which shows a notable decline in the length of the average federal sentence 
beginning in 2008, the year following the Supreme Court’s December 10, 2007 decisions in 
Kimbrough and Gall which made clear that the guidelines were henceforth to be really and truly 
advisory.  
 
Moreover, as Figure 2 below illustrates, during the last decade, there has been a near-perfect 
inverse correlation between sentence severity and the exercise of judicial sentencing discretion.  
As the percentage of sentences outside the applicable range increases, the length of the average 
sentence decreases, and vice versa. 
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 However, a closer look at the data suggests that the recent decline in average sentence 
length is, at best, only partially attributable to the newly advisory character of the guidelines.  It 
is widely understood that some of the recent decline in average sentence length is probably 
attributable, not to discretionary choices by judges, but to changes in statutes and guidelines 
governing crack and powder cocaine.  What is less appreciated is that the marked decline in 
average federal sentence beginning in 2008 correlates directly with the recent explosion in 
relatively low-sentence immigration prosecutions. Figure 3 illustrates the point.  FY 2008 may 
have been the year in which judges reading Kimbrough and Gall first understood that they had a 
green light to vary from the guidelines at will, but probably more importantly it also marked the 
beginning of a huge upsurge in immigration cases, which went from 17,592 or 24.2% of all 
federal cases in 2007
19
 to roughly 30,000 or 35.2% of all cases in 2011.
20
  Given that the average 
sentence for an immigration case is 16.3 months, as compared to 70.2 months for drug 
trafficking, 82.7 months for firearms, and 22.7 months for fraud,
21
 the downward pressure 
exerted on the federal average sentence of this one change in case mix is immense. 
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Fig. 2: Severity vs. Discretion 





The tenuousness of the correlation between declining national average sentence severity and 
post-Booker judicial discretion is reinforced by inspection of the Commission’s most recent data 
on average sentence within offense types.  It appears that, since 2006, the average sentence for 
crack cases has declined sharply; average powder cocaine, marijuana, and illegal reentry 
sentences have dropped slightly; average sentences for alien smuggling, methamphetamine, and 




These figures hold mixed messages for policy advocates.  The defense community is surely 
right in thinking that advisory Guidelines have produced lower sentences for some thousands of 
defendants each year.  Given the slow, but steady, increase in below-range sentences since 2007, 
they would also be right in thinking (even if they may not be impolitic enough to say it) that the 
percentage of defendants benefiting from this phenomenon is likely to increase steadily over 
time.  On the other hand, those who fear that advisory guidelines have opened the floodgates of 
judicial leniency should be reassured that nothing apocalyptic has occurred so far and that 
average sentences for most classes of defendants are, at most, only slightly lower than historic 
averages in the guidelines period. 
The foregoing observations go far to explain the lack of agitation among the front-line 
sentencing actors for a thorough-going reform of the post-Booker status quo.  For persons 
enmeshed in an operating system and highly attuned to any change in incremental advantage or 
disadvantage to their own positions, it makes perfect sense to ask, not whether Booker produced 
the best possible system, or even a system that, dispassionately considered, is very good, but 
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simply whether the Booker system is incrementally better or worse for them than its predecessor.  
Judges and defense lawyers have concluded that they are incrementally better off.  The Justice 
Department seems to have concluded that it is, so far, not so much worse off as to make it 
worthwhile to press for a thorough reform. 
The perspective of the Commission, of Congress, and the public at large ought to be rather 
less parochial.  If, as I believe to be true, the pre-Booker guidelines system was so flawed as to 
require complete overhaul, then the question before us now is whether Booker remedied enough 
of those flaws to make the post-Booker advisory system a desirable long-term mechanism for 
sentencing federal defendants.  I do not believe the post-Booker system meets that standard. 
For example, the real severity problem with the pre-Booker guidelines was not that judges 
had too little discretionary power to make adjustments for unusual defendants whose situations 
did not fit sentence levels that the Guidelines had set about right for most classes of cases. The 
problem was that, as a result partly of some initial decisions in 1987 and partly of a long process 
of factor-creep thereafter, the guidelines often prescribed unnecessarily lengthy sentences for 
entire categories of defendants.  Making the Guidelines advisory does not solve this problem.  It 
gives some defendants relief by allowing judges to disregard rules they think too severe, but it 
does not change the rules themselves. So long as the rules prescribe unduly lengthy sentences, 
post-Booker experience suggests that most defendants for whom those sentences are prescribed 
will get them, or at best sentences only slightly lower.  It is more than a trifle ironic to hear 
longtime critics of guideline severity cite the modest extent of most downward variances from 
the guideline range as a defense of the current system.
23
  And the question of who gets the 
guidelines sentence and who does not will be based far more on the personal predilections of the 
judge assigned the case than the particular characteristics of the defendant.   
Supporters of the advisory system make much of the proliferation of “feedback” to the 
Commission in the form of an increased number of variances from the Guidelines. They claim 
that the Commission will react to this new source of information about judicial sentencing 
preferences by embarking on rounds of corrective amendments.  I confess to skepticism.   
First, the problem with the pre-Booker system was never an absence of feedback from judges 
(or any of the other system actors) about their concerns with the guidelines.  The Commission 
has always been at the delivery end of a fire hose of feedback.  The problem before Booker was 
that the Commission was unwilling or unable to change the rules in response to the feedback 
they had.   
Second, the Commission has been more active in the last several years in passing 
ameliorative amendments to the Guidelines, making commendable strides on crack and some 
other issues. But I confess to thinking that its ability to make these strides has had far more to do 
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with the fact that Democrats gained control of both the House and Senate in January 2007 and 
won the presidency effective January 2009 than with any Booker-generated increase in the 
volume or quality of judicial feedback to the Commission.   
Third, even in the more hospitable recent environment, the Commission has been unable to 
address some glaringly obvious problem areas.  For example, it has been almost universally 
recognized since 2003 that the sentences prescribed by the Guidelines for high-end white collar 
offenders are so high as to be practically worthless.
24
 Observers on both the political left and 
right, as well as judges, the defense bar, advocacy groups, and the Justice Department, have been 
providing “feedback” on this issue for years signaling that they are actively seeking or are at 
least amenable to reform.  Yet the Commission has not acted.  No fair-minded person would 
attribute this inaction to either a lack of awareness or a lack of good will on the part of the 
Commission.  Yet nothing has happened.   
The Commission’s newest amendments to the fraud guidelines in response to the Dodd-
Frank Act, which take effect in November 2012, differ commendably from those adopted in the 
wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in largely eschewing new enhancements that would continue 
the process of factor creep.
25
  Nonetheless, perhaps feeling that some identifiable new increment 
of severity was politically required, the Commission added a minimum offense level of 14 for 
those “engaged in an organized scheme to engage in insider trading,”26 as well as a cross-
reference triggering the enhancement for use of a special skill for certain job descriptions in the 
securities industry.
27
  In short, the 2012 round of amendments does not reduce the severity of 
fraud sentences called for by the Guidelines, but nudges them higher than ever. 
The problem is that the structural and institutional deficiencies in the pre-Booker guidelines 
rule-making system remain essentially unaddressed by Booker.  I will not reiterate the complete 
analysis of this phenomenon that I have provided elsewhere.
28
  Suffice it to say that the 
combination of the guidelines’ complexity, the desire of the Justice Department for case-level 
control and rule-making influence, the persistent political incentives for Congress to legislate 
harsher sentences, and the Sentencing Commission’s institutional inability to resist the alliance 
of congress and the executive whenever they seek “tough” sentences made the guidelines rule-
making process a one-way upward ratchet before Booker.  I see nothing in the post-Booker 
arrangements that materially alters this reality.  I fail to see how an “advisory” system which 
maintains the same bad rules and the same structural inability to fix them is magically 
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transformed into a desirable outcome simply by virtue of conferring on individual judges the 
authority to ignore at will the rules they happen to dislike. 
C. The Sentencing Empire of the Federal District Court Judge 
Which brings me to a third major concern about the post-Booker system.  Supporters of the 
post-Booker system whose approval rests on the additional “feedback” provided by district court 
variances are embracing an extra-legal mechanism which has few, if any, analogues in Anglo-
American jurisprudence.  In any other setting, when district courts apply or interpret or 
adjudicate challenges to agency rules, their decisions not only bind the parties, but are appealable 
to courts of appeals, and in the end form part of the web of legislation and interpretive judicial 
precedent that binds subsequent litigants, judges, and sometimes the rule-making agency itself.  
That is, they are part of the process of making law.  Yet, in the “advisory” world, district judges 
routinely make decisions that are effectively unreviewable as to substance.  Because they are 
effectively unreviewable, they are incapable of creating precedent binding other courts.  And 
because they bind neither courts nor the Commission itself, to the Commission they represent 
nothing more than data points in an opinion poll.  If one is to have sentencing rules at all, it 
seems to me that the appropriate “feedback loop” when judges apply those rules to punish other 
human beings is the normal operation of the adjudicative process. 
D. A Few Words About Disparity 
Now that district judges are at liberty to impose nearly any sentence they choose, an earlier 
generation of sentencing critics would have anguished over the unjust disparities between 
similarly situated defendants that must surely arise in an arrangement so devoid of coordination 
or constraint.  Defenders of the advisory system, however, are resolute in their determination to 
banish all discussion of disparity.  They argue variously that sentencing disparities are inevitable 
(or even desirable) in a large federal system,
29
 that the pre-Booker guidelines did not materially 
reduce disparity, or that the advisory guidelines have not materially increased it. Sometimes, in a 
nicely Orwellian twist, they even seem to argue that there is really no such thing as an 
unwarranted disparity because different sentences necessarily reflect judicial determinations of 
importantly different individualizing factors.
30
  And sometimes they simply declare that disparity 
just is not that important relative to other concerns like severity.
31
 
While it is surely true that in the Guidelines era disparity has sometimes received undue 
attention, the disparity arguments by admirers of advisory guidelines mostly miss the mark.  
Regional disparity:  In the first place, significant differences between the sentences imposed 
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on similarly situated defendants based on the place they happen to be arrested should concern us.   
Surely, if the national government prescribes penalties for crime, those penalties should be 
imposed with at least rough uniformity throughout the nation.  It is one thing to recognize that 
perfect uniformity is not possible and that some regional variation is inevitable.  It is another 
thing altogether to imply that regional disparity is a positive good and one of the wonders of 
federalism. Serious proponents of a legally presumptive guidelines system do not imagine that 
perfect uniformity is possible, but would suggest that perfect anarchy is undesirable and that 
presumptive rules can help reduce disparate treatment. 
 
At present, there is no statistically rigorous analysis of whether the post-Booker system has 
materially increased regional disparity.  However, rough indicators of such a trend do exist.  In 
2010, in another FSR article, I described signs of increasing post-Booker regional sentencing 
disparities.
32
  The trend appears to be continuing. Consider, for example, Figures 4A and 4B, 
which compare the ten districts with the lowest and highest percentages of in-range sentences in 
2003, the last full year before Blakey was decided, and 2011.  While both years show significant 
variation from the most-to-least guidelines-adherent districts in the country, by 2011 the 
variations are much bigger.  In 2003, the difference between the most and least guidelines-
adherent districts was 47.8% and between the tenth most and least guidelines-adherent districts 
was 17.4%.  By 2011, the difference between the most and least guidelines-adherent districts was 
not that much greater, at 55.8%, than it was in 2003, but the gap between the tenth most and least 
guidelines-adherent district nearly doubled in comparison to 2003 to 34.7% 
 
Figure 4A: 
Districts With Lowest and Highest Percentages of Within-Range Sentences (FY 2003) 
 
Lowest Districts % in Range Highest Districts % in Range2 
AZ  41 W.D. Okl 88.9 
Idaho 48.8 Puerto Rico 87.8 
CT 50.6 E.D. Ark. 86.9 
E.D. Pa. 51.9 E.D. Tex. 85 
E.D. NY 55.3 M.D. N.C. 84.9 
W.D. NY 55.4 N.D. Okl. 84.8 
NH 56.1 Montana 83.7 
N.D. NY 59.6 W.D. Ky. 82.6 
Minn 63 Kansas 82.3 
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Districts With Lowest and Highest Percentages of Within-Range Sentences (FY 2011) 
 
Lowest Districts % in Range Highest Districts % in Range2 
E.D. Wisc. 24.6 S.D. Miss. 80.4 
S.D. Cal. 28.3 S.D. Ga. 80.2 
E.D. NY 30.5 M.D. Ga. 80.1 
Minn 31.3 W.D. Ark. 76.4 
Vermont 31.7 S.D. Ill. 76.2 
C.D. Cal. 32.5 E.D. Okl. 76 
S.D. Ohio 34.4 E.D. Va. 74.9 
S.D. NY 34.9 Puerto Rico 74.7 
E.D. Wash. 35 W.D. La. 71.9 
Utah 35.9 M.D. N.C. 70.6 
 
The point is even better illustrated by Figures 5A and 5B, which are scatter plots of the 
percentage of sentences within range for all judicial districts in 2002 and 2011. Viewing these 
images, there is no escaping the fact that the sentencing practices across the country are far more 
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Figure 5A:   





Intra-judge disparity: Whatever may be said about regional disparity, one of the 
acknowledged accomplishments of the Guidelines was that they reduced the degree of disparity 
between sentences imposed by different judges in the same district.
33
  As with regional disparity, 
there is not as yet definitive evidence of the effect of Booker on inter-judge disparity, but 
preliminary indications are consistent with the intuition that judges freed of appellate control will 
sentence more idiosyncratically than those subject to enforceable rules.  The one rigorous study 
conducted in the District of Massachusetts showed that in the years following Booker, 
Kimbrough, and Gall, the effect of judge identity on sentencing outcome more than doubled.
34
  
Now that the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse has succeeded in creating a 
sentencing database with judge identifiers,
35
 it would be surprising indeed if similar results were 
not replicated in other districts. 
Disparity and Politics: Regardless of the merits of the disparity debate, its political 
importance can hardly be overstated.  Before Booker, the federal sentencing system needed 
fundamental revision.  Booker did not change that reality.  Sooner or later, the growing evidence 
that the advisory guidelines are an institutional façade obscuring increasingly divergent judicial 
practice will draw sufficient attention from political actors that change will come.  The only 
question is when the crisis will arrive, and what form the change will take. 
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III. The Objectives of a New System 
 If the current advisory system is to be replaced, we must be reasonably confident that the 
replacement: (a) is constitutional under the post-Booker rules, (b) gives reasonable, but not 
unlimited, play to individualized sentencing and judicial discretion, (c) prescribes sentences that 
reasonably effectuate the utilitarian goals of crime control while conforming more closely to 
most people's moral intuition about severity than many of the current guidelines, and (d) is 
capable of evolution without becoming a one-way upward ratchet. 
IV. Constitutionally permissible guidelines architectures 
Given the current state of post-Booker Sixth Amendment jurisprudence,
36
 there are at 
least five constitutionally permissible, operationally practicable basic sentencing architectures: 
 1)  Return to pre-guidelines discretionary sentencing:  One might abandon the entire 
structured sentencing enterprise and revert to the pre-1987 federal status quo in which district 
judges had unguided and virtually unreviewable discretion to impose a sentence anywhere 
between the statutory maximum and minimum sentence as traditionally defined.  This would be 
constitutional.
37
  No institutional actor in federal sentencing favors this approach.     
 2)  "Blakely-ized" guidelines: At the other extreme, one might simply require that juries 
find all facts now specified by the guidelines that would increase a defendant’s offense level.  
This would be constitutional, but it would be both procedurally burdensome and even more 
restrictive of judicial discretion than the guidelines in their pre-Booker form.
38
  So far as I know, 
no institutional actor in federal sentencing favors this approach.   
 3)  "Topless" guidelines:  This architecture takes advantage of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in McMillan v. Pennsylvania
39
 and Harris v. United States
40
 that facts which increase a 
defendant’s minimum sentence may be found by judges rather than juries.  It would leave the 
pre-Booker federal guidelines essentially unchanged, with the single key exception that post-
conviction judicial findings of fact regarding offense level would produce sentencing ranges with 
minimums as presumptive as they were before prior to Booker, but maximums that would be 
merely advisory.  In 2004, I suggested this approach as a temporary expedient in response to 
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 and, for a time, it was the preferred remedy of the Justice Department.
42
  However, the 
approach was always subject to the objection that it asymmetrically favored the government, as 
well as the nagging concern that the Supreme Court might abandon the rule of McMillan and 
Harris upon which its constitutionality depended.
43
  The Justice Department no longer seems 
enamored of this approach and I am aware of no other institutional actors currently supporting it. 
 4)  "No-base-offense-level" guidelines: It is possible to reinstitute legally binding 
guidelines systems based on post-conviction findings of fact by judges, and to do so 
constitutionally, by the simple expedient of eliminating "base offense levels" or their equivalents 
from the guidelines design. I have described this guidelines architecture previously,
44
 but it has 
not been generally discussed. Its constitutionality flows from the three essential points of the 
Apprendi-Blakely-Booker line of cases.  First, the government must allege and prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt to a jury each and every element of a criminal offense.  Second, an element is 
any fact that increases the statutory maximum sentence of an offense.  And third, what Justice 
Ginsburg identified as "Apprendi’s bright-line rule" -- "The 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi 
purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of facts reflected in 
the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."
45
   
 In short, the key moment for the Sixth Amendment jury right is the moment at which the 
jury has rendered its verdict or the defendant entered his plea.  If, at that moment, the law 
correlates the jury's verdict or defendant's plea with a maximum penalty above which the judge 
may not sentence a defendant without finding some additional fact, that maximum penalty 
becomes the "statutory maximum sentence."  Any fact, proof of which would permit the judge to 
impose a sentence above that maximum sentence, becomes an "element" requiring submission to 
a jury.  It was this focus on the sentencing options available to the judge at the moment of 
conviction without further fact-finding that rendered the Washington, California, and federal 
guidelines sentencing regimes unconstitutional.  In each case, the jury's verdict had two 
sentencing effects - first, it set the absolute outside limits on the judge's sentencing discretion in 
the form of statutory maximum and minimum sentences as traditionally understood, and second, 
it created a presumptive sentencing range (or in the case of California, a presumptive single-
point sentence) based purely on the fact of conviction.  In all three of the invalidated systems, a 
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judge could impose a sentence above the presumptive sentence or range, but in all of them the 
judge could not do legally so without finding some fact(s) in addition to those found by the jury 
(or admitted by the defendant).   
 The Washington state guidelines invalidated in Blakely v. Washington
46
 prescribed for 
each offense in the Washington criminal code a presumptive sentencing range based purely on 
the fact of conviction.
47
  This range was customarily somewhere in the middle of the broader 
span between the statutorily designated minimum and maximum sentences for the crime.  After 
conviction, the judge could sentence the defendant above (or below) the presumptive range if, 
but only if, he made findings of aggravating (or mitigating) facts not included within the offense 
of conviction.
48
  However, in no case could the judge sentence the defendant to more than the 
maximum sentence prescribed by statute for the offense of conviction. 
 The California guidelines system invalidated in Cunningham v. California
49
 functioned 
similarly, except that the fact of conviction generated both a statutory minimum-to-statutory-
maximum range and a presumptive single-point sentence within that range – the so-called 
“middle term.”  By law, the sentencing judge was obliged to impose the middle term unless the 
judge found “circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime.”50  If, but only if, the court 




 Finally, for the vast majority of federal crimes, the federal guidelines set a "base offense 
level," i.e., an offense level generated purely by the fact of conviction of a particular crime.  This 
base offense level, in conjunction with the defendant's criminal history (which need not be found 
by a jury pursuant to U.S. v. Almendarez-Torres), produces a sentencing range identifiable at the 
moment of conviction.  The constitutional flaw in the federal guidelines was thus that every 
increase in offense level above the base level required at least one judicially-found fact, as did 
any departure above the top of the final sentencing range.  Particularly because most federal 
guidelines were designed with relatively low base offense levels and multiple potential upward 
level adjustments, much and maybe most of the customary judicial fact-finding activity in a 
workaday federal sentencing had the effect of raising the defendant's maximum sentence above 
the top of the range associated with the base offense level.  Accordingly, since judicial findings 
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of fact raised the defendant's maximum sentencing exposure higher than that authorized by the 
base offense level created by conviction alone, the process was found to violate Blakely.
52
 
 One could create guidelines that meet the Court's Sixth Amendment test by eliminating 
the correlation between the mere fact of conviction and any particular guideline offense level.  In 
such a system, at the moment of conviction, it would be impossible to determine "solely on the 
basis of facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant"
53
 any maximum limit on 
the judge's sentencing authority other than the statutory maximum in the traditional sense.  For 
example, a conviction of one count of mail fraud would, standing alone, have no sentencing 
consequence other than to authorize a maximum sentence of thirty years pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
Sec. 1343.  At the time of the verdict or plea, the defendant, his lawyer, the prosecutor, and the 
judge might be able to form a good estimate of what facts the sentencing judge might later find 
and thus how subsequent guidelines calculations would pan out, but as a matter of law, no 
guideline maximum would be generated until the sentencing proceeding was concluded.  The 
final guideline range would be determined by judicial findings, but the guideline maximum 
would almost invariably be below, and would never exceed, the statutory maximum sentence 
determined by the jury-found elements of the offense.  Thus, there would be no Sixth 
Amendment violation. 
  This approach would certainly be better than “topless guidelines” inasmuch as it would 
not require an unfair asymmetry.  Like the “topless” model, it could be invalidated by the Court 
if they were to reverse Harris because it, too, would involve correlating judge-found facts with 
increases in a presumptive minimum sentence.  Otherwise, I am hard pressed to see a 
constitutional flaw based on the Sixth Amendment as the Court has construed it.  The most 
obvious objection to this approach is not that it is constitutionally defective, but that it could be 
employed to resurrect the guidelines, with all the flaws enumerated above, virtually unchanged.  
For that reason, I do not favor its adoption. 
 5)  Constitution Project / FSR / Judge Sessions guidelines: In 2005-2006, the Constitution 
Project Sentencing Initiative, a bipartisan panel of experts chaired by former Attorney General 
Edwin Meese and former Deputy Attorney General Philip Heymann and including luminaries 
such as then-Judge Samuel Alito, Judge Jon O. Newman, Judge Paul G. Cassell, Judge Nancy 
Gertner, Thomas W. Hillier, II, and James Felman, studied the post-Booker sentencing landscape 
and formulated a set of “Principles for the Design and Reform of Sentencing Systems.”54  The 
group also prepared a set of “Recommendations for Federal Criminal Sentencing in a Post-
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Booker World.”55  The group recommended that, in the near term, the advisory system created by 
Booker should be carefully studied and incrementally improved.
56
  But the group went on to 
suggest a framework for a revised federal guidelines system should the advisory system 
ultimately be found wanting.
57
 
 The Constitution Project guidelines framework rested on five basic elements.  First, the 
sentencing grid should be markedly simplified by widening sentencing ranges and reducing the 
number of offense levels from 43 to something on the order of ten.
58
  Second, the defendant’s 
position on the vertical offense seriousness axis of the grid (and thus his sentencing range) would 
be determined by facts found by juries.
59
  Third, if it were thought wise to guide judicial 
sentencing discretion within the widened ranges, the rules or standards providing that guidance 
should not be unduly detailed or restrictive.
60
 Fourth, there should be ample provision for 
discretionary judicial departures below the jury-created sentencing ranges (including departures 
for what is now called substantial assistance).
61
  Fifth, the Committee emphasized the importance 
to any improved sentencing system of requiring sentencing judges to provide “careful statements 
of reasons.”62  
 After the Constitution Project Sentencing Initiative completed its reports, an ad hoc 
working group of lawyers and academics
63
 took those reports a step further and drafted a set of 
Model Federal Sentencing Guidelines employing the principles established by the Constitution 
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Project.  These Model Guidelines were published in Volume 18, Number 6 of the Federal 
Sentencing Reporter (June 2006).   
 In 2011, Judge William Sessions, former chair of the Sentencing Commission, published 
an excellent article advocating adoption of simplified presumptive guidelines with the same 
essential features recommended by the Constitution Project and the Model Guidelines Working 
Group.
64
   
V. Recommendations  
A.       Adopt the Constitution Project/FSR/Sessions model 
 The Constitution Project/FSR/Sessions model represents the most desirable option among 
the constitutionally permissible architectures.  All the variations on this theme so far proposed, 
though they differ in their details, combine a solution to the technical constitutional problem 
posed by Blakely with structural modifications designed to address many of the major 
substantive criticisms of the pre-Booker guidelines.  
1. They would be simpler than the existing guidelines, requiring fewer findings of fact.  
This simplicity would make jury involvement practical (unlike the option of Blakely-
izing the existing guidelines) because juries would be asked to find only a few facts in 
addition to the conventional elements now confided to their charge.  It should also 
make the post-conviction judicial sentencing process simpler. 
2. The system’s relative simplicity should give political actors fewer opportunities for 
micromanaging sentencing outcomes. 
3. The wider ranges would give judges more room for the operation of judicial 
discretion, while placing some reasonable presumptive limits on that discretion. 
4. Various mechanisms have been suggested for constraining or guiding judicial 
discretion within the wider presumptive ranges.
65
  My current view is that the best 
approach both in substance and in relation to potential constitutional challenges is 
simply to write advisory guidelines enumerating aggravating and mitigating factors 
that judges should consider in exercising their discretion to sentence near the bottom, 
in the middle, or towards the top of the range. 
5. In this system, the ranges created by jury findings would be presumptive only.  In 
order for such a system to meet its policy objectives, the judge must have substantial 
discretionary departure authority to impose a sentence below the jury-determined 
range and the decision to depart should be subject to appellate review.  While it is 
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difficult to articulate a precise standard in advance, the degree of departure authority 
and the standard of review should no more restrictive than that granted by the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Koon.
66
 In my view, a system structured in this 
way would balance the need for some legal constraint on judicial sentencing 
discretion with the need for ample judicial authority to individualize sentences in 
particular cases. 
6. Because of the Court’s decision in Booker, there could be no discretionary authority 
to depart above the jury determined presumptive guidelines range.  However, it would 
be possible to create a mechanism for presenting to juries some predetermined set of 
factors that, if found, would permit a judge to sentence above the otherwise 
applicable range in truly egregious or aggravated cases. 
7. This system would also permit meaningful, though appropriately deferential, 
appellate review of district court sentencing decisions within jury created ranges.  A 
real difficulty in any post-Booker system is designing a process of appellate review 
for sentences within statutory maxima and minima that does not run afoul of the 
Blakely construct of what an “element” is.  For example, Justice Scalia believes that 
any substantive review of a sentencing judge’s choice of sentence within the statutory 
maximum and minimum runs afoul of Blakely because the appellate court’s ruling 
would have the effect of creating by common law certain zones above which a 
defendant could not be sentenced without the sentencing court finding particular 
facts.
67
  However, I think the majority of the Court would accept a regime requiring 
that a judge provide a statement of reasons for assignment of a within-range sentence 
and that the judge’s sentence and his explanation be reviewable on a reasonableness 
standard. 
B.  Sentence length 
Essential to the success of a new structured model would be a genuine and bipartisan 
effort to re-examine and, where appropriate, recalibrate the federal sentencing scale for all 
offenses.  This will sound to some like code for an effort to reduce federal sentence length willy-
nilly.  But I hope it will be remembered that the first seventeen years of my professional life 
were spent primarily as a federal and state prosecutor and, while I may have mellowed a bit with 
age, I still believe in stern punishments for those who have done evil.  The problem with many 
corners of the federal sentencing guidelines is that, with the accretion of amendments over 25 
years, they have gradually become divorced from any rational calculation of how much 
punishment of what type best meets the objectives of a society that deserves both protection and 
an intelligent allocation of the resources it contributes to fighting crime. 
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The latter point deserves our particular attention.  In past debates over federal sentence 
length, the cost of protracted imprisonment of numerous defendants was never a limiting 
consideration.  That may no longer be the case.  Concern over deficit financing of the federal 
budget is now bipartisan.  And I am reliably informed that the cost of running the Bureau of 
Prisons is becoming so high that the Justice Department is facing the prospect of cutting 
programs devoted to catching criminals now on the street in order to pay for the cost of 
incarcerating those already in prison.  A better balance can surely be achieved. 
Moreover, those whose focus is primarily on ensuring appropriately severe punishment 
should remember something that everyone involved in the day-to-day operation of federal 
criminal law already knows – rules, whether “mandatory” or "advisory," that prescribe sentences 
significantly higher than can be supported by ordinary intuitions of justice will be ignored or 
evaded.  Professor Heise and I documented this phenomenon in drug cases a decade ago.
68
  A 
current, and even more glaring, example is the sentencing of high-loss corporate offenders.  
Guidelines for these cases are now pitched so high, calling for multi-decade sentences for 
virtually every defendant of even moderate culpability, that no one pays them any serious 
attention.  Prosecutors and judges alike would be far better served by fraud guidelines that 
prescribed sentences that, while tough, could be rationally imposed.   
While I may be naïve, it should be possible, over a reasonable interval, to work out 
between the institutional actors a system that prescribes appropriately stern, but realistic, 
sentences and arrives at an equilibrium between judicial discretion and legislative will. 
VI. “A Republic … If You Can Keep It” 
Even if the post-Booker system is undesirable, and even if one can design a materially better 
system that, at its inception, calibrates sentences rationally and provides appropriate balance 
between general rules and individualizing discretion, how do you keep it?  What assurance is 
there that the new system will not degenerate in undesirable ways?  To this there are two 
answers: 
First, there can be no absolute assurances.  The nature of human systems is that they change.  
Flawed systems sometimes improve.  Even the best-designed system will to some extent degrade 
on contact with messy reality.  However, I do not think that the chimera of a perpetually perfect 
system should be a permanent barrier to enacting a system better than what we now have. 
Second, the forces that combined to transform the 1987 guidelines into a one-way upward 
ratchet are sufficiently strong that one should not adopt a new system without accounting for 
those forces.  In the end, this may be the single hardest problem facing the would-be reformer of 
federal sentencing.  Time and space preclude a full exploration of this problem; however, I 
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would suggest, tentatively and subject to later elaboration, that a solution would: (a) combine the 
Constitution Project/FSR/Sessions architecture with (b) a reconfiguration of the Sentencing 
Commission and its relation to the judiciary. 
A.  The Constitution Project/FSR/Sessions architecture should be less subject to ill-
considered legislative manipulation than the current guidelines in either their pre- or post-Booker 
forms.  Simplifying the sentencing table, widening the ranges, and thus reducing the number of 
intersections between ranges should reduce the temptation to "tweak" a guideline for political 
effect.  It should also enable the Commission to respond to most expressions of congressional 
concern by altering the advisory guidelines directed at judicial sentencing discretion within 
ranges.  While congressional suggestions and directives would undoubtedly continue, this system 
should enable the Commission to accommodate congressional concerns with less distortion of 
the guidelines design and less of an upward ratchet effect. 
B.  The Sentencing Commission’s rulemaking process should be made more akin to that 
required of other independent agencies by the Administrative Procedures Act and other 
governmental openness statutes, and (2) a mechanism for direct judicial review of the 
Commission’s rules should be devised.  These are not novel suggestions, having been advanced 
at various times by Professors Ronald Wright and Kate Stith.
69
  Both have suggested that better, 
more open, more procedurally regular rule-making procedures would generate better rules.  I 
agree, but my primary interest in this reform flows from the intuition that more rigorous 
rulemaking reviewable by the courts should also provide the Commission's rules more insulation 
from short-term political pressure.   
VII. Conclusion 
The truth is that no political impetus now exists to change the post-Booker advisory system 
in any significant way.  So why trouble to imagine a regime that has no present chance to be 
realized?  The answer, I suppose, is that the existing fantastic structure cannot indefinitely 
survive its own absurdity or the steady accretion of evidence that it merely disguises sentencing 
by judicial whim.  Someday, in a year, or five, or ten, we will have to build anew.  It behooves us 
to plan ahead. 
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